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CLIMATE TORTS: IT’S A CONSPIRACY! 
Abstract: As public concern about climate change grows, so does frustration 
with the federal government’s inability to develop a strategy for reducing green-
house gas emission. Consequently, in the past decade, multiple states and munic-
ipalities have filed lawsuits seeking to address climate change through common 
law claims, such as public nuisance. Courts, however, dismissed many of these 
suits because the Supreme Court held in 2011, in American Electric Power Com-
pany v. Connecticut, that the Clean Air Act governs greenhouse gas emissions 
and therefore displaces the common law as a cause of action. Despite this unfa-
vorable precedent, the past three years produced numerous new climate-related 
lawsuits against fossil fuel companies. Almost all these cases cite the fossil fuel 
industry’s decision to misrepresent and conceal the link between their products 
and climate change as a driving impetus for the lawsuits. Nevertheless, plaintiffs 
continue to base their complaints on the perilous legal foundation of public nui-
sance. This Note argues that plaintiffs seeking to hold fossil fuel companies ac-
countable for climate change should instead bring causes of action for civil con-
spiracy and fraud. By combining civil conspiracy with fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion and fraudulent concealment, plaintiffs can require companies to pay for what 
has consistently delayed climate action: disinformation about the nature and 
causes of climate change. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, it became apparent that climate change would force the re-
location of Newtok, Alaska’s residents.1 As villagers waited for the govern-
ment to act, melting permafrost destabilized foundations and buckled roads.2 
Reduced pack-ice allowed storm surges from the Bering Sea to rush up the 
Ninglick River and caused massive erosion, bringing the village ever closer to 
the water.3 The village landfill and wastewater treatment plant closed due to 
flooding and erosion.4 Sewage leaked into the water supply.5 In October 2019, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Greg Kim, Residents of an Eroded Alaskan Village Are Pioneering a New One, in Phases, NPR 
(Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/02/774791091/residents-of-an-eroded-alaskan-village-
are-pioneering-a-new-one-in-phases [https://perma.cc/XK4S-MNRC]. 
 2 Craig Welch, Climate Change Has Finally Caught Up to This Alaska Village, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/10/climate-change-finally-caught-
up-to-this-alaska-village/ [https://perma.cc/2EHE-5MLJ].  
 3 Id. 
 4 Suzanne Goldenberg, America’s First Climate Refugees, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/interactive/2013/may/13/newtok-alaska-climate-change-
refugees [https://perma.cc/2PMX-MQY3]; Welch, supra note 2. 
 5 Goldenberg, supra note 4. 
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after more than twenty-five years of waiting, some of America’s first climate 
refugees finally moved to their new homes.6 
Newtok, Alaska is a Yup’ik village home to almost four hundred people.7 
Situated along the mouth of the Ninglick River and the Bering Sea, Newtok 
sits on permafrost that started thawing during the last decades of the twentieth 
century.8 The extended process of moving this native Alaskan village, which 
will cost more than one hundred million dollars, is largely the result of the fed-
eral and state governments’ failure to develop an overarching strategy to relo-
cate climate refugees.9 Of course, developing such a program would require 
political leaders to acknowledge the scientific consensus that climate change is 
real and caused by human beings.10 In Alaska, and nationally, many elected 
and appointed officials still deny fundamental climate science.11 
In the face of climate denial by politicians, several states and municipali-
ties turned to the courts for relief and sued major fossil fuel companies, such as 
Exxon, Suncor, Chevron, and BP, under state and federal tort law.12 These law-
                                                                                                                           
 6 Kim, supra note 1; Welch, supra note 2. The term “climate refugee” does not have a uniform 
definition or recognition within international law; however, it is used in here to describe individuals 
displaced by climate impacts such as extreme weather, desertification, and rising sea levels. Tim 
McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention to, NPR (June 20, 2018), https://www.npr.
org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-
to [https://perma.cc/BYR8-F7QK]. 
 7 Welch, supra note 2. The Yup’ik are native Alaskans traditionally living on the coast of Bering 
Sea in the Yukon Delta region of Southwest, Alaska. Paula Ayunerak, et al., Yup’ik Culture and Con-
text in Southwest Alaska: Community Member Perspectives of Tradition, Social Change, and Preven-
tion, 54 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH. 91, 93 (2014). 
 8 Goldenberg, supra note 4; Welch, supra note 2. 
 9 Suzanne Goldenberg, An Undeniable Truth?: From Palin to Parnell, Alaska’s Politicians Have 
Struggled to Reconcile Policy with Actuality, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2013), https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/interactive/2013/may/14/alaska-politics-climate-change-sarah-palin [https://perma.cc/
SL56-SBAW]; Kim, supra note 1. 
 10 See Ellen Cranley, These Are the 130 Current Members of Congress Who Have Doubted or 
Denied Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/climate-
change-and-republicans-congress-global-warming-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/4Z9D-FJMA] (naming 
the members of Congress who deny climate change as “[s]tanding in the way of” climate action). 
 11 See id. (providing an overview of current members of Congress who are climate deniers); 
Goldenberg, supra note 9 (explaining the challenge of addressing climate change in Alaska when state 
leaders doubt its severity). Although Alaska is on the frontlines of climate change, Alaska’s governor, 
Michael Dunleavy, quietly ended the state taskforce designed to coordinate the state’s response in 
2019. Nathaniel Herz, Alaska GOP Gov. Dunleavy Disbands State Climate Response Team, ALASKA 
PUB. MEDIA (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/02/23/alaska-gop-gov-dunleavy-
disbands-state-climate-response-team/ [https://perma.cc/LZA3-BHWK]. 
 12 E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011); Native Vill. of Kivalina 
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy 
(U.S.A.) Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 947, 954–55 (D. Colo. 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. 
Supp. 3d 142, 146, 148 (D.R.I. 2019); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 
538, 548 (D. Md. 2019); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Cnty. of San 
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  
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suits sought compensation from the defendant companies for the cost of state 
or municipal programs adapting to, and mitigating the effects of, climate 
change.13 The plaintiffs in these suits primarily relied upon theories of negli-
gence and public nuisance as their causes of action.14 Courts, however, have 
struggled with this approach and dismissed many of the suits.15 Federal courts 
dismissed some suits after determining that the Clean Air Act displaced federal 
public nuisance law when it came to climate change.16 Other suits have met 
their demise when courts, uncertain of how to assign responsibility for climate 
change, dismissed the complaints as political questions better left to the legis-
lature.17 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853 (seeking monetary damages after having to relo-
cate the village due to climate change); Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (seeking contribution for 
damage anticipated from climate change); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (seeking money 
damages for the cost of sea level rise); Cnty. of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (seeking compen-
sation for climate mitigation and adaption). For example, in Rhode Island, the State sought relief from 
the anticipated damages of climate change. 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146. Specifically, the State sought 
compensation for the costs associated with repairing and fortifying infrastructure from severe weather 
and rising sea levels. See id. (“Casualties are expected to include the State’s manmade infrastructure, 
its roads, bridges, railroads, dams, homes, businesses, and electric grid; the location and integrity of 
the State’s expansive coastline[;] . . . vast sums are expended to fortify before and rebuild after the 
increasing and increasingly severe weather events . . . .”). 
 14 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418 (suing for public nuisance); Native Vill. of Kivalina, 
696 F.3d at 853 (bringing a claim of public nuisance); Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 148 (suing for 
public nuisance); Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 548 (bringing claims of public 
nuisance, negligence, and strict liability); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (suing fossil fuel 
companies for creating a public nuisance); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1019 (asking the court 
to grant relief under public nuisance law); City of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (claiming dam-
ages for public nuisance and negligence). 
 15 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415 (dismissing public nuisance claim because the 
Clean Air Act’s carbon dioxide regulations displaced the plaintiffs’ right to common law relief); 
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2013) (dismissing the suit because 
mitigating climate change is a task for Congress and not federal courts); Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 
F.3d at 858 (same); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 478 (same). 
 16 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (deciding that the Clean Air Act displaced the feder-
al common law of public nuisance); Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 (same). 
 17 See Comer, 718 F.3d at 466 (upholding the district court decision that claims presented “non-
justiciable political questions”); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (finding that the Clean Air 
Act displaced the common law and the task of assigning responsibility for climate change was a polit-
ical question). Climate change is a global issue whose impacts and causes are not confined to a single 
country; therefore, the regulation of greenhouse gases will have significant impact on the global econ-
omy. See PAUL GRIFFIN, CDP, THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 
2017, at 8 (2017) (outlining how a variety of international corporations and state-owned entities have 
contributed to greenhouse gas emissions). If fossil fuel companies continue to develop at the same rate 
as they have during the past three decades, the global average temperature is expected to increase by 
at least 4° Celsius by the end of 2100. Id. at 7. This business as usual emissions pathway would be 
catastrophic, however, because anything more than a 1.5° Celsius- increase in global average tempera-
ture risks triggering feedback loops that could forever alter human society and decimate global biodi-
versity. MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICY MAKERS 5, 7–11 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_
944 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:941 
These climate tort lawsuits arose, in large part, from revelations that the 
fossil fuel industry knew about the dangers of climate change but nevertheless 
chose to fund disinformation campaigns designed to spread doubt and confu-
sion regarding the existence, cause, and risks of climate change.18 If the de-
fendants’ misinformation is the impetus for the current spate of climate tort 
suits, then plaintiffs should sue fossil fuel companies for their coordinated ef-
forts to defraud the American public about the link between fossil fuel energy 
and anthropogenic climate change.19 Plaintiffs can accomplish this by suing 
fossil fuel companies, including their trade associations and think tanks, for 
civil conspiracy and fraud.20 
                                                                                                                           
version_report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9A5-JPHG] (summarizing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5° C). 
 18 See Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854 (charging that defendants worked together to dis-
credit climate science); Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (claiming that the defendants deliberate-
ly sowed doubt about climate science to protect their profits); Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. 
Supp. 3d at 548 (asserting that the defendants misled the public regarding the risks posed by fossil 
fuels); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (alleging that the defendants hid and otherwise 
distorted the impacts of their products); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468–69 (claiming that 
the defendants undertook efforts to confuse the public about the connection between fossil fuels and 
climate change); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 (alleging that the defendants engaged in 
public relations efforts designed to minimize the dangers of climate change); see also NAOMI 
ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED 
THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 214 (2010) (explaining how 
industry-funded experts successfully infiltrated mainstream media and political discourse on climate 
change); Sara Jerving et al., What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2015), https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/ [https://perma.cc/4EGC-EJ3W] (discussing how 
Exxon’s internal climate research led to corporate adaption efforts even as the company actively pro-
moted the idea that climate science was unsettled); Amy Lieberman & Susanne Rust, Big Oil Braced 
for Global Warming While It Fought Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), https://graphics.la
times.com/oil-operations/ [https://perma.cc/758B-AG34] (detailing how Mobile Oil, Shell, and other 
fossil fuel companies altered their infrastructures to account for rising sea levels while at the same 
time funding think tanks that attacked climate science and discouraged government adaptation and 
mitigation efforts). 
 19 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing how fossil fuel companies conspired to 
spread misinformation about climate science and how plaintiffs include that misinformation in their 
complaints). 
 20 See Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that a civil conspiracy is 
when two or more persons act together to achieve an unlawful purpose or to achieve a lawful one by 
unlawful means). The Restatement (Third) of Torts defines civil conspiracy as requiring three ele-
ments: 1) a meeting of the minds to commit a tortious or illegal act; 2) an underlying tort; and 3) actu-
al damage to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (AM. L. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2018). As the elements make clear, a civil conspiracy, as a cause of ac-
tion, is predicated on the completion of some underlying tortious act by at least one party in the con-
spiracy. Id.; see Alder v. Fenton, 65 U.S. (1 Black) 407, 410 (1861) (adopting the English common 
law construction from Savile v. Roberts that civil conspiracy requires the actual harm (quoting Savile 
v. Roberts (1698) 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150; 1 Lord Raym 374, 378)). In cases involving accusations 
that an industry conspired to hide information from the public, most plaintiffs rely on fraudulent mis-
representation or fraudulent concealment as the independent tort. Richard Ausness, Conspiracy Theo-
ries: Is There a Place for Civil Conspiracy in Products Liability Litigation?, 74 TENN. L. REV. 383, 
400, 402 (2007). The litigation strategy proposed in this Note likewise relies upon fraud to meet the 
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Part I of this Note examines the history of climate tort lawsuits and climate 
denialism.21 Part II discusses the elements of a claim of civil conspiracy.22 Final-
ly, Part III of this Note analyzes the various aspects of a climate conspiracy case 
against fossil fuel companies and argues that a climate conspiracy-based litiga-
tion strategy may prove more fruitful for litigants than the existing climate litiga-
tion strategy based in state common law of public nuisance and negligence.23 
I. TORT LAW AND THE HISTORY OF CLIMATE DENIAL 
In 2015, the Los Angeles Times and Energy and Environmental Reporting 
Project at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism jointly released 
an exposé outlining the disparities between Exxon’s internal understanding of 
climate change and the company’s public positions.24 For example, even as 
Exxon’s executives used shareholder meetings to publicly attack climate change 
models as unreliable guesswork, the company relied on those same models to 
plan for changes to its arctic operations.25 These revelations generated enough 
backlash against Exxon that several state attorneys general announced investiga-
tions into Exxon for securities and consumer fraud.26 Exxon, however, was not 
the only company who misled the public about climate change.27 Over the last 
                                                                                                                           
independent tort requirement. See infra notes 178–193 and accompanying text. Furthermore, civil 
conspiracy is a particularly useful tort, despite the independent tort requirement, for three reasons: 1) 
it imposes liability on secondary actors—those who planned, funded, or encouraged the underlying 
tort; 2) it extends the reach of long-arm jurisdiction over non-resident defendants; and 3) it exempts 
from the hearsay rules statements made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Thomas J. Leach, Civil 
Conspiracy: What’s the Use?, 54 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 11, 12 (1999). Additionally, civil conspiracy has 
been used to impose liability on trade associations and industry-sponsored think tanks. See Rogers v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 799–800 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that claims against 
the Tobacco Institute could proceed because sufficient evidence existed that the Institute conspired 
with tobacco producers to hide the negative health consequences of smoking).  
 21 See infra notes 24–86 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 87–159 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 160–208 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Jerving et al., supra note 18 (explaining how even as Exxon scientists accurately predicted 
changes to sea ice and other climate impacts, the company publicly maintained that the science was 
too uncertain to warrant action). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Massachusetts Accuses Exxon in Lawsuit of Climate Change Deceit, 
REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-mobil-lawsuit-massachusetts/
massachusetts-accuses-exxon-in-lawsuit-of-climate-change-deceit-idUSKBN1X32GA [https://perma.
cc/7F7X-EATX] (explaining that Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey filed a lawsuit ac-
cusing Exxon of misleading investors about the risks climate change posed to the business while lying 
to consumers about the connection between fossil fuels and climate change); John Schwartz, New 
York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying It Deceived Shareholders on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/climate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html [https://
perma.cc/23YH-5XWZ] (discussing the New York Attorney General’s investor fraud lawsuit against 
Exxon for minimizing the climate-risks of climate change). 
 27 See CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, KOCHLAND: THE SECRET HISTORY OF KOCH INDUSTRIES AND 
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 392–426 (2019) (detailing Koch Industries’ strategy for defeating 
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five years, a flurry of tort lawsuits has sought to hold fossil fuel producers ac-
countable for their contributions to climate change.28 Section A explores the his-
tory of climate tort lawsuits in the United States.29 Section B describes the ef-
forts fossil fuel companies took to delay public policy action on climate change 
by manufacturing doubt regarding climate science.30 
A. History of Climate Tort Lawsuits 
Climate tort lawsuits occur when states or individuals assert their common 
law rights to recover damages related to climate change.31 Subsection 1 discuss-
es climate tort lawsuits under federal common law.32 Subsection 2 explores the 
more recent trend of bringing climate tort suits under state common law.33 
1. Federal Climate Lawsuits 
The first major climate tort lawsuit was American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2011.34 In Ameri-
can Electric Power Co., eight states, New York City, and three private land trusts 
sued five electric utility companies that constituted some of the largest green-
house gas emitters in the United States.35 The plaintiffs claimed that the carbon 
dioxide emissions from the defendants’ power plants constituted a public nui-
sance.36 They argued that these emissions contributed to global warming, which, 
                                                                                                                           
federal climate change legislation as well as its history of funding climate denialism); Lieberman & 
Rust, supra note 18 (explaining that Exxon, Mobil, Shell and other oil companies spent millions of 
dollars lobbying against policies that would regulate greenhouse gas emissions). 
 28 E.g., Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019); Mayor & City 
Council of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 548 (D. Md. 2019); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Suncor 
Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 947, 948 (D. Colo. 2019); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. 
Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 29 See infra notes 31–64 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 65–86 and accompanying text. 
 31 See, e.g., Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (suing under public nuisance to recover damag-
es for rising sea levels and extreme weather resulting from defendants’ climate change causing emis-
sions); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 954–55 (seeking recovery under nuisance, trespass, 
and negligence law for the cost of climate change impacts, such as drought and wildfires); City of New 
York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (seeking money damages for the cost of protecting New York City 
against sea level rise). 
 32 See infra notes 34–50 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 34 See 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011) (holding for the first time that the Clean Air Act displaced the 
federal common law’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas pollution). 
 35 Id. at 418. The plaintiffs were California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, New York City, Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservancy, 
Inc., and Audubon Society of New Hampshire. Id. at 418 nn.3 & 4. The defendants were American 
Electric Power Company, Inc., Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., Cinergy Corporation, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. Id. at 418 n.5. 
 36 Id. at 418. 
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in turn, impacted public health, infrastructure, and the habitat of plant and animal 
species enjoyed by citizens and landowners represented by the plaintiffs.37 The 
plaintiffs sought to limit the emissions of each power plant and require that 
emissions decrease over time.38 The Supreme Court determined that because 
Congress delegated the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act dis-
placed the federal common law in this area.39 The Court, therefore, dismissed 
the case.40 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. at 418–19. At the time of the lawsuit, the defendants’ emissions “constitute[d] 25 percent of 
emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10 percent of emissions from all domestic human 
activities, and 2.5 percent of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide.” Id. at 418 (citation omitted). 
Public nuisance can be thought of as an interference with the general public’s ability to access a public 
right. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUB. NUISANCE § 821B (AM. L. INST. 1979). The interfer-
ence must be unreasonable, which is generally defined as “significant interference with the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience . . . .” Id. 
 38 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 419. The plaintiffs did not specify a specific percentage by 
which the cap should be reduced annually; instead, they looked to the court to determine an appropri-
ate decrease. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated 
and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). After the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case under the political question doc-
trine, the plaintiffs appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s dismissal. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 419. The political question doctrine is 
designed to maintain the separation of power between the branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The doctrine is often attributed to the Supreme Court’s 1803 decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison, where the Court refused to order the Secretary of State fulfill Marbury’s commis-
sion. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”). Questions that 
could be dealt with by the legislature or executive are not automatically deemed political questions. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Instead political questions exist when the Constitution assigns an issue to 
another branch of government, when no “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” exist for 
resolving it, or when a judicial decision would impinge upon or contradict the prerogative of another 
branch of government. Id.  
 39 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (holding that the right to federal common-law relief 
from climate-change-causing power plant emission is displaced because the Clean Air Act and the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) regulations directly address the management of green-
house gas emissions). The plaintiffs argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that the federal common 
law is not displaced until the EPA fully exercised its regulatory authority and set emissions standards 
for carbon dioxide at the defendant’s plants. Id. at 425–26. But the Supreme Court rejected this ap-
proach and determined that displacement occurred once Congress delegated authority over an issue to 
an agency. See id. at 426 (holding that by providing the EPA with authority to regulate air pollution, 
Congress displaced the common law right, because even if the EPA to decline to act, federal courts 
would not be able to abrogate that decision by granting relief under federal nuisance law). Even if the 
EPA had developed a system to regulate greenhouse gas emission, plaintiffs seeking compensation for 
climate-related damages would find suing under the Clean Air Act inadequate, because although the 
citizen suit provision allows individuals to sue for compliance, plaintiffs are unable to recover mone-
tarily. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Any civil penalties imposed by the courts under the Clean Air Act are 
paid to the United States Treasury. Id. § 7604(g)(1). 
 40 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424. For a detailed discussion of how environmental advo-
cates and states hoped the Supreme Court would handle standing in climate tort suits, see Gregory 
Bradford, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 1065 (2011). 
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In the years since, many federal courts have continued to dismiss climate 
tort suits following American Electric Power Co.’s rationale.41 For example, in 
2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., by applying the Supreme Court’s 
precedent.42 In Native Village of Kivalina, an Alaskan village and the indige-
nous tribe sued a group of twenty-two fossil fuel companies and electric utili-
ties claiming that the companies’ greenhouse gas emissions constituted a pub-
lic nuisance.43 Melting sea ice, allegedly caused by the defendants’ emissions, 
exposed the village, situated on a barrier island north of the arctic circle, to 
erosion and forced the relocation of the village’s entire population.44 The court 
determined that the plaintiffs could not recover relocation costs or other dam-
ages from the defendants because the Clean Air Act displaced the common law 
of public nuisance.45 
Similarly, in 2018, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York also followed the precedent set forth in American Electric 
Power Co. and dismissed City of New York v. BP P.L.C.46 New York City al-
leged that the defendants sold oil and gas products that caused the harmful ef-
fects of climate change, including a rise in the sea level.47 New York City tried 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the Clean Air Act had displaced the federal common law of nuisance); City of New York v. BP 
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466,472 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that New York City could not use the 
common law to recover for climate change damages because the Clean Air Act had displaced the tort 
remedy). 
 42 696 F.3d at 856. 
 43 Id. at 853. The defendants in this case were ExxonMobil Corporation, BP P.L.C., BP America, 
Inc., BP Products North America, Inc., Chevron Corporation, Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Conocophillips 
Company, Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Shell Oil Company, Peabody Energy Corporation, The AES Cor-
poration, American Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric Power Services Corporation, 
Duke Energy Corporation, DTE Energy Company, Edison International, Midamerican Energy Hold-
ings Company, Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, The Southern Company, Dynegy Holdings, Inc., 
Xcel Energy, Inc., and Genon Energy, Inc. Id. at 853 n.1. 
 44 Id. at 853–54. The sea ice, which historically protected the village from storms, began to desta-
bilize due to warming ocean and atmospheric temperatures, threatening the village’s very existence. 
Id. at 853. As a result, the village became exposed to the Bearing Sea’s seasonal storms. Id. This ex-
posure accelerated erosion of the land on which the village is situated. Id. 
 45 See id. at 856 (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision that Congress had displaced the 
common law as it relates to carbon dioxide emissions required that they dismiss the case). The court 
acknowledged that, unlike the plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co., Kivalina does not want to 
limit future emissions. Id. at 857. Instead, the Native Village of Kivalina plaintiffs sought to recover 
damages flowing from the defendants’ past emissions. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that 
“the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to the applicability of the doctrine of displacement. . . . . 
Thus, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of action is displaced, displacement is 
extended to all remedies.” Id. 
 46 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (holding that precedent requires the dismissal of 
New York City’s public nuisance and trespass claims related to the defendants’ carbon dioxide pollu-
tion). 
 47 Id. at 469–70. The defendants in this case were BP P.L.C., Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon, 
and Royal Dutch Shell. Id. at 468. 
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to navigate around American Electric Power Co. by framing its complaint to 
address the sale of oil and gas products.48 The City argued that the Clean Air 
Act regulates emissions but not “the production and sale of fossil fuels,” and, 
therefore, argued that the court should not displace the City’s common law 
right.49 The court acknowledged that the defendants’ products primarily caused 
climate change; however, it rejected the City’s novel approach.50 
2. State Climate Lawsuits 
In recent years, recognizing that principles established by American Elec-
tric Power Co. foreclose recovery under federal law, plaintiffs have developed 
a new strategy based upon state tort law claims.51 In American Electric Power 
Co., the Court declined to consider whether the Clean Air Act also preempted 
state common law.52 As a result, plaintiffs began tailoring their lawsuits to state 
common law claims.53 
The success of this strategy, however, remains uncertain as federal district 
courts have produced inconsistent rulings.54 Federal courts in Rhode Island, 
Maryland, and Colorado have remanded climate tort lawsuits against fossil 
fuel companies to state courts.55 For example, in 2018 in Mayor & City Coun-
cil of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., Baltimore sued twenty-six fossil fuel companies 
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City under state tort and statutory law for 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 474. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. (finding that because the climate change damages were caused by the burning of fossil fuels 
and not their sale, the City was attempting to regulate the same activity addressed in American Elec-
tric Power Co.). 
 51 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019) (explaining 
that the plaintiff’s tailored their complaint to only bring state law claims); Mayor & City Council of 
Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 548 (D. Md. 2019) (same); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Sun-
corEnergy (U.S.A.) Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 947, 954–55 (D. Colo. 2019) (same); City of New York v. 
BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (bringing state law claims while also struc-
turing federal law so as to avoid displacement); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 
3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (asserting state law claims). 
 52 See 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011) (explaining that none of the parties argued this claim and, there-
fore, the Court declined to review it). 
 53 E.g., Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (bringing eight state law claims); Mayor & City 
Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 548 (claiming that the defendants violated seven provision of the 
Maryland common law as well as the Maryland Consumer Protection Act); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 
405 F. Supp. 3d at 954–55 (asserting six Colorado common law and statutory causes of action); City 
of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (alleging three state law causes of action). 
 54 Compare Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (finding that state law claims govern), with City 
of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (finding that federal law, not state law, governs all issues involv-
ing interstate pollution). 
 55 See, e.g., Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 152; Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d 
at 574; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 981. 
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damages suffered from climate change allegedly caused by the defendants.56 
The defendants removed the case to federal court, and Baltimore filed a motion 
requesting the court remand the lawsuit back to state court.57 The United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland subsequently found that federal-
question jurisdiction did not exist because federal law neither governed nor 
completely preempted state law, and remanded the case back to state court for 
trial under state law.58 Similarly, in Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. and Board 
of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 
the United States District Courts for the District of Rhode Island and the Dis-
trict of Colorado, respectively, agreed with the plaintiffs’ assertions that the 
state law claims governed and remanded each case to state court.59 In October 
2019, the Supreme Court refused to stay the remands of the Rhode Island, Bal-
timore, and Boulder County cases while the fossil fuel companies appealed.60 
                                                                                                                           
 56 388 F. Supp. 3d at 548, 574; Complaint at 107–30, Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP 
P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Balt. City Cir. deferred Aug. 6, 2020). Baltimore brought eight state law 
claims: “public nuisance (Count I); private nuisance (Count II); strict liability for failure to warn 
(Count III); strict liability for design defect (Count IV); negligent design defect (Count V); negligent 
failure to warn (Count VI); trespass (Count VII); and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection 
Act (Count VIII).” Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 548 (citation omitted). 
 57 Id. at 548–49. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any defendant has the right to file a 
notice of removal to federal court within thirty days of the filing of the initial complaint. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b)(1). The case may be removed in two instances: 1) if the claim could have been filed in 
federal court; or 2) if there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. Id. § 1441(a), (b). Once a 
case has been removed from state to federal court, the non-moving party has thirty days to file a mo-
tion for remand if they believe the federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. § 1447(c). The 
federal court must then decide if it has the authority to hear the case or if the proper venue is state 
court. Id. 
 58 Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 557, 574. Federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution only grants federal courts jurisdiction 
in a limited set of circumstances, such as in suits between citizens of different states and in suits ques-
tioning federal law. Id. When suits arise under federal law, they are said to trigger federal question 
jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson ex rel. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) 
(explaining that “cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are 
those in which federal law creates the cause of action”). In such situations, the federal law is said to 
“create[] the cause of action.” Id. As a result, courts look to the complaint to determine if federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists. Id. Defenses that rely upon a federal question will not trigger jurisdiction. Id. 
The existence of a federal statute is not the only method of triggering federal question jurisdiction, 
however. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) 
(explaining that federal courts should be able to hear state law claims if the claim raises significant 
federal law questions). State law claims that involve a federal issue can trigger federal-question juris-
diction to ensure consistency across jurisdictions. Id. 
 59 Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 152; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 981; see 
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (remanding to state court). 
 60 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Lets Climate Change Lawsuit Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/us/supreme-court-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/
SX5P-ZTF9]. The Supreme Court’s decision to refuse to stay the remand means the state court pro-
ceeding will continue while the respective circuit courts hear the appeals of the remand order. Id. 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to intervene pending appeal, the de-
cision to remand state common law cases has not been universal.61 Federal 
courts in both California and New York refused to remand similar cases, in-
stead determining that federal interests trump the state’s interest when it comes 
to climate change.62 These courts held that the plaintiffs’ claims arose as a re-
sult of cross-boundary emissions, and therefore the federal interest in uniform 
treatment outweighed the state’s individual interest.63 As a result, it remains 
uncertain if the strategy of bringing claims under the state common law of nui-
sance, trespass, and negligence will succeed.64 
B. The Climate Denial Conspiracy 
Scientists first discovered the relationship between carbon dioxide emis-
sions and climate change in the late 1800s.65 In fact, in 1896 a Swedish scien-
tist, Svante Arrhenius, calculated that a doubling of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide would result in a total warming of the planet by five-to-six degrees Celsi-
us.66 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson became the first president to receive 
an official warning about the dangers fossil fuels posed to the global climate 
system.67 In the report issued by the President’s Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee, some of the nation’s top scientists warned that an increase in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide due to the burning of fossil fuels would not only raise surface 
temperatures, but also melt ice caps, raise sea levels, increase ocean tempera-
ture, and acidify fresh water.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See, e.g., City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding 
that federal jurisdiction was appropriate); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (same). 
 62 See, e.g., City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (holding that interstate pollution is a 
federal question); City of Oakland, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 (holding that determining the effects of 
climate change, including coastal flooding, is a federal question). 
 63 See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72 (stating that lawsuits over pollution that cross 
state and international boards are within the domain of federal common law); City of Oakland, 294 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1021 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ state law public nuisance claims triggered federal 
jurisdiction because only federal law can provide the uniformity in result needed to address a problem 
such as climate change). Cross-boundary emissions—pollution that impacts public health and the 
environment across state lines—constituted one of the primary justifications for federal regulation of 
air pollution. Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution Un-
der the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 1, 13 (1996). 
 64 See Liptak, supra note 60 (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the 
Clean Air Act preempts state common law on the issue of climate change). 
 65 See, e.g., Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature 
of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. SCI. 237 (1896) (calculating the effects of greenhouse gases). 
 66 Id. at 266. 
 67 See ENV’T POLLUTION PANEL OF THE PRESIDENT’S SCI. ADVISORY COMM., RESTORING THE 
QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 112 (1965) (providing a thorough report of the effects of pollution). 
 68 Id. at 123–24. 
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Oil companies were once at the leading edge of understanding the scien-
tific connection between their product and global warming.69 As early as the 
1950s, the American Petroleum Institute (API), a trade association representing 
a number of stakeholders in the U.S. energy industry, alerted oil and gas com-
panies that fossil fuel use would significantly alter our climate system.70 In 
fact, in 1968, API published a report warning of the serious impacts API sus-
pected could occur by the end of the century as atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentration increased, including warming oceans, melting ice caps, and ris-
ing sea levels.71 
Additionally, between 1979 and 1983, API members formed the Climate 
and Energy Task Force (Task Force) to coordinate their scientific findings on 
global warming.72 The Task Force’s notes demonstrate that members under-
stood the relationship between carbon dioxide and global average temperature, 
and that the Task Force recognized the near unanimity among scientists that 
continued greenhouse gas emissions would produce catastrophic impacts on 
the planet.73 
API’s approach to climate change shifted significantly by the late 
1980s.74 In August 1988, facing growing concerns about a warming climate, 
executives at Exxon circulated an internal memorandum on climate change.75 
The memorandum acknowledged the consensus among climatologists that fos-
sil fuels were contributing to climate change.76 The memorandum also argued, 
however, that Exxon must promote uncertainty among the public and Congress 
on the level of consensus within the scientific community in regards to the ef-
fects of greenhouse gases.77 By promoting uncertainty, Exxon could avoid pol-
icies designed to mitigate climate change, such as mandatory reductions in 
carbon dioxide emissions, that would in turn hurt their business practice by low-
                                                                                                                           
 69 ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 18, at 170 (explaining how the scientist Roger Revelle found 
the connection between fossil fuels and carbon dioxide). 
 70 City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 71 See E. ROBINSON & R.C. ROBBINS, STANFORD RSCH. INST., SOURCES, ABUNDANCE, AND 
FATE OF GASEOUS ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS 109 (1968) (“[M]an is now engaged in a vast geo-
physical experiment with his environment, the earth. Significant temperature changes are almost cer-
tain to occur by the year 2000 and these could bring about climatic changes.”). 
 72 City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468. 
 73 Id. at 468–69. 
 74 Compare ROBINSON & ROBBINS, supra note 71, at 109 (concluding, in 1968, that humans are 
dangerously manipulating the climate), with Chris Mooney, Some Like It Hot, MOTHER JONES (May 
2005), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2005/05/some-it-hot/ [https://perma.cc/8DAM-
SF7A] (describing how API downplayed the risks and questioned the cause of climate change). 
 75 Katie Jennings et al., How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change Research, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/ [https://perma.cc/ANR5-
X9E3]. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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ering the demand for fossil fuels.78 Less than one year later, fossil fuel compa-
nies and their associated industry organizations created the Global Climate Coa-
lition (GCC) to create public uncertainty about climate science.79 The GCC at-
tempted to discredit climate models, questioned the need for action on global 
warming, asserted non-anthropogenic causes of climate change, and, at times, 
outright denied its existence.80 These efforts were funded, at least in part, by 
API.81 
The strategy of promoting a public perception that climate change science is 
uncertain continued from the 1980s to the present day.82 In 1998, the New York 
Times revealed an internal API memo outlining a multi-million dollar plan to 
convince the public and lawmakers that the science on climate change remained 
unsettled.83 Between 2000 and 2016, fossil fuel interests spent nearly two billion 
dollars on lobbying against climate change legislation and regulations.84 Addi-
tionally, the five largest publicly traded oil companies have spent nearly one bil-
lion dollars challenging policies designed to combat climate change since the en-
actment of the Paris Agreement.85 The fossil fuel industry’s large-scale misinfor-
mation campaign has largely succeeded in eroding public trust in climate science 
and stalling efforts to achieve meaningful policy change.86 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. (describing Exxon’s opposition to policy proposals to “reduce [global] emissions of 
CO2 by 10% by 1990”). 
 79 Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18; Mooney, supra note 74. 
 80 Mooney, supra note 74. 
 81 Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18. 
 82 See Sandra Laville, Top Oil Firms Spending Millions Lobbying to Block Climate Change Poli-
cies, Says Report, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/
22/top-oil-firms-spending-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-says-report [https://
perma.cc/44MM-95S5] (“The largest five stock market listed oil and gas companies spend nearly 
$200m (£153m) a year lobbying to delay, control or block policies to tackle climate change . . . .”). 
 83 John H. Cushman Jr., Industrial Group Plans to Battle Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/26/us/industrial-group-plans-to-battle-climate-treaty.html 
[https://perma.cc/YP8J-HWYV]; Mooney, supra note 74. The API memo said that “[v]ictory will be 
achieved when . . . recognition of uncertainty becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom.’” Mooney, 
supra note 74 (alteration in original). 
 84 Robert J. Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on Climate 
Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016, 149 CLIMATE CHANGE 289, 289 (2018). 
 85 INFLUENCEMAP, BIG OIL’S REAL AGENDA ON CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW THE OIL MAJORS 
HAVE SPENT $1BN SINCE PARIS ON NARRATIVE CAPTURE AND LOBBYING ON CLIMATE 2 (2019). 
The Paris Agreement is an international climate change agreement adopted in 2015 by members of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Paris Agreement to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. Under the agree-
ment every nation submits a specific level of reduction it will commit to reaching. Id. at art. 4 § 2. 
Nations are supposed to update their commitments at least every five years. Id. at art. 4 § 9. 
 86 See ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 18, at 214 (explaining how industry-funded experts suc-
cessfully infiltrated mainstream media and political discourse on climate change); Justin Farrell, 
Kathryn McConnell, & Robert Brulle, Evidence-Based Strategies to Combat Scientific Misinfor-
mation, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 191, 191–92 (2019) (finding that the proliferation of scientific 
misinformation has polluted public dialogue, contributed to increased polarization across the United 
States, and inhibited the passage of climate change legislations); see also Robert J. Brulle, Institution-
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II. CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN TORT LAW 
A civil conspiracy is where two or more persons act together to achieve 
an unlawful purpose or to achieve a lawful purpose by unlawful means.87 Civil 
conspiracy is a particularly appealing tort for plaintiffs because it allows them 
to bypass certain procedural hurdles.88 First, civil conspiracy can be useful in 
imposing liability on secondary actors, particularly those who planned, funded, 
or encouraged the underlying tort, even if they did not commit the tort them-
selves.89 For example, in 1988, the Texas Appeals Court held in Rogers v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. that a tobacco trade association and an industry-
sponsored think tank were liable under a civil conspiracy claim, despite not 
manufacturing or distributing tobacco.90 Second, some jurisdictions allow a 
plaintiff to use a conspiracy cause of action to support the court’s exercise of 
long-arm jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, provided that the court has 
personal jurisdiction over at least one conspirator.91 Finally, proving conspira-
                                                                                                                           
alizing Delay: Foundation Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement 
Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 681, 687 (2014) (tracing the sources of funding of think tanks 
that promote climate denialism); Justin Farrell, Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization 
About Climate Change, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 92, 94–95 (2016) (tracking how corporate 
funding influences the effort to sow disagreement over the veracity of climate science); Justin Farrell, 
Network Structure and Influence of the Climate Change Counter-Movement, 6 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 370, 373 (2016) (mapping the network and influence of climate denial organizations). 
 87 Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1938).  
 88 Leach, supra note 20, at 11. 
 89 See Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 262 P. 302, 303 (Cal. 1927) (holding civil conspiracy “renders each 
participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tort-feasor for all damages ensuing from the 
wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activi-
ty”); Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922, 925–26 (Tex. 1979) (holding each co-
conspirator “is responsible for all acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful 
combination”). 
 90 Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 799–800 (Tex. App. 1988); see Jeffer-
son v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 247–48 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding that a lead paint trade 
association could be held liable for conspiracy, but ultimately dismissing the claim because the plain-
tiff was unable to prove all elements of the underlying tort), aff’d, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 91 See Textor v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1392–93 (7th Cir. 1983) (recog-
nizing that conspiracy extends long-arm jurisdiction); Gemini Enters., Inc. v. WFMY Television 
Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (same); Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (same). Long-arm jurisdiction extends personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that 
although the due process clause provides non-residents with some protection from judgment in foreign 
jurisdictions, if the non-resident “purposely avails” themselves of the jurisdiction, the state is justified 
in asserting jurisdiction over the defendant). Normally, long-arm jurisdiction requires a three-part test: 
1) Is there relevant contact between the defendant and the forum; 2) Does the plaintiff’s claim arise 
from the defendant’s contact in with the forum; and, 3) Is jurisdiction fair? See Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (describing how the due process clause protects a defendant 
from adjudication in an unfamiliar jurisdiction). 
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cy allows for an exemption from the hearsay rules for statements made “in fur-
therance of the conspiracy.”92 
Despites its usefulness, civil conspiracy has proven to be a difficult tort 
for many plaintiffs to successfully employ against product manufacturers.93 
This is largely because of the difficulty in proving all the elements of a civil 
conspiracy.94 The Restatement (Third) of Torts defines the elements of civil 
conspiracy as containing three elements: 1) an agreement or meeting of the 
minds; 2) a substantive underlying tort other than the conspiracy; and 3) actual 
harm.95 First, Section A discusses what constitutes an agreement for the pur-
pose of proving a civil conspiracy.96 Next, Section B explores the difficulties in 
proving a substantive underlying tort.97 Finally, Section C examines the damages 
that a plaintiff may wish to pursue, including restitution and lost opportunity.98 
A. The Agreement 
In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, plaintiffs must first prove 
that the alleged conspirators agreed to commit a wrongful act.99 For example, 
in 2001 in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability Liti-
gation, the plaintiffs accused the defendants of forming task forces and other 
organizations, including the MTBE Committee, to conceal the dangers of 
                                                                                                                           
 92 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The existence of a conspiracy, however, must be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (holding that a 
proponent of a co-conspirator statement must demonstrate the conspiracy by the preponderance stand-
ard before the evidence may be admitted). Co-conspirators are treated as agents of one another; there-
fore, once a conspiracy has been established, the out-of-court statements of one co-conspirator can be 
used to tie another co-conspirator to the wrongful act. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 
n.6 (1974) (stating that the justification for the co-conspirator statement hearsay exception is based on an 
agency theory); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926) (holding that all co-
conspirators are responsible for the actions one conspirator takes in furtherance of the conspiracy). 
 93 See Ausness, supra note 20, at 383 (“Surprisingly, less than half of the civil conspiracy claims 
have made it to trial. This unimpressive success rate suggests that courts are not very receptive to civil 
conspiracy claims even when there is strong evidence of wrongdoing by product manufacturers.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 94 Id. at 412. 
 95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (AM. L. INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 3, 2018) (defining the elements of civil conspiracy as: “(a) [t]he defendant made an agreement 
with another to commit a wrong; (b) a tortious or unlawful act was committed against the plaintiff in 
furtherance of the agreement; and (c) the plaintiff suffered resulting economic loss”). 
 96 See infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 111–133 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 134–159 and accompanying text. 
 99 See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 635 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding an agreement existed between conspirators to hide the risks of Methyl Ter-
tiary Butyl Ether); McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 259 (Ill. 1999) (dis-
missing the conspiracy claim because the evidence was inadequate to find that an agreement existed 
between asbestos manufacturers). 
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MTBE.100 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants plotted to deceive the 
government and the public about the dangers posed by MTBE.101 The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found the for-
mation of the various industry task forces were enough to support a claim of an 
unlawful agreement.102 
In many cases, however, plaintiffs lack evidence of an agreement, such as 
the formation of the MTBE committee.103 In these situations, courts allow for 
circumstantial evidence of an agreement, such as parallel conduct.104 Most 
courts, however, will not allow circumstantial evidence on its own to prove the 
agreement.105 For example, in 1999, in McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., the Supreme Court of Illinois heard a case in which several asbestos 
manufacturers allegedly conspired to conceal the negative health impacts of 
asbestos.106 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that to meet the burden demon-
strating an actual conspiracy, the plaintiffs would need to show some direct 
evidence of an agreement between the defendants.107 The plaintiffs, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 100 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634. MTBE is a gasoline additive developed from oil refining byproducts. 
Id. at 599. As early as 1978, the defendant oil companies were sharing information about MTBE con-
tamination. Id. at 601. During the mid-1980s, scientific studies about the dangers of MTBE began to 
emerge and through the auspice of their trade associations, oil companies publicly challenged the 
validity of the studies, while internally acknowledging that they had no data that contradicted the 
reports. Id. When the EPA proposed additional health and safety testing of MTBE, Amoco, Arco, 
Chevron, Citgo, Exxon, Shell, Sunoco, Texaco, and Conoco formed the MTBE Committee. Id. at 602. 
The MTBE Committee provided the EPA with less than complete information about MTBE and suc-
cessfully dissuaded it from requiring additional health and safety testing. Id. 
 101 Id. at 602.  
 102 Id. at 635. In addition to the MTBE Committee, oil companies used trade associations, such as 
the Oxygenated Fuels Association, to convince the public that the risk of MTBE contaminating 
groundwater was minimal. Id. at 602. 
 103 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that plain-
tiffs were unable to provide concrete evidence of an agreement to commit an illegal act); McClure, 
720 N.E.2d at 259 (same); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 47–48 (Wis. 1984) (same). 
 104 See McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 259 (“[P]arallel conduct may serve as circumstantial evidence of 
a civil conspiracy.”). Parallel conduct is when companies in the same industry behave in the same or a 
substantially similar manner. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 321 (3d Cir. 
2010) (providing as an example of parallel conduct “setting prices at the same level,” which may be 
indicative of a conspiracy or simply an interpretation of what consumers will pay). 
 105 See McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 259 (“Our review of the case law from other jurisdictions con-
vinces us that the overwhelming weight of authority has refused to accept mere parallel action as 
proof of conspiracy.”); see also In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d at 1294 (holding that “we do not 
see how a rational jury could find the existence of a civil conspiracy . . . based solely on the alleged 
fact that Pfizer and other defendants consciously engaged in parallel conduct”); Thompson Coal Co. v. 
Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 473 (Pa. 1979) (“The mere fact that two or more persons, each with the 
right to do a thing, happen to do that thing at the same time is not by itself an actionable conspiracy.” 
(quoting Fife v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 52 A.2d 24, 39 (1947)); Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47–48 
(“[T]he drug companies apparently engaged in parallel behavior in both 1941 and 1947, but parallel 
behavior alone cannot prove agreement.”). 
 106 McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 245–46. 
 107 Id. at 267. 
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could only proffer evidence of parallel conduct as proof of an agreement and 
failed to produce any direct evidence that the companies agreed to suppress the 
health information.108 The court, therefore, considered such circumstantial evi-
dence insufficient to prove that an actual conspiracy existed between the asbes-
tos manufacturers.109 Requiring more evidence than parallel conduct alone to 
prove a conspiracy forces plaintiffs to produce some concrete evidence that the 
defendants knowingly conspired.110 
B. The Substantive Tort 
A civil conspiracy as a cause of action is predicated on the completion of 
some underlying tortious act by at least one party in the conspiracy.111 Not all 
torts will satisfy this independent tort requirement; instead, most courts require 
that the underlying tort must be an intentional one, because joining a conspira-
cy is an intentional tort and one cannot conspire to do a negligent act.112 
Indeed, proving the completion of the underlying tort is essential for suc-
ceeding in a claim of civil conspiracy.113 If plaintiffs fail in their burden to 
prove the substantive tort, their claim for civil conspiracy will also fail.114 For 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. The three plaintiffs in this case asserted that they, or their husbands, were exposed to as-
bestos as a result of work for Unarco. Id. at 245–46. The asbestos was manufactured by Johns–
Manville; however, the plaintiffs did not bring a suit against either Unarco or Johns–Manville. Id. at 
245. Instead the plaintiffs sued Owens Corning based on the theory that Owens Corning conspired 
with Johns–Manville and Unarco, as well as others, to hide information about the health risks posed 
by asbestos. Id. 
 109 Id. at 267. 
 110 See id. at 262 (stating that additional evidence beyond parallel conduct is “necessary to protect 
manufacturers from becoming insurers of their industry”); Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47–48 (holding that 
parallel conduct was not evidence that the plaintiffs worked together to deceive the Food and Drug 
Administration). 
 111 See Alder v. Fenton, 65 U.S. 407, 410 (1861) (adopting the English common law construction 
that civil conspiracy requires the actual harm). As Judge Learned Hand observed, this construction is 
notably different than the construction of conspiracy used in criminal law. Lewis Invisible Stitch 
Mach. Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Mach. Mfg. Corp., 80 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1936) (explaining 
that in criminal law, the conspiracy to break the law is punishable in and of itself, but the same is not 
true in tort law). 
 112 E.g., Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797, 837 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Allstate Indem. 
Co. v. Lewis, 985 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc., 929 F. 
Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Allen v. Allison, 155 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ark. 2004); Adcock v. 
Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. 1994); Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1996). 
Scholarly critique of the independent tort requirement exists; however, courts have not been receptive 
to this idea. See Leach, supra note 20, at 27–29 (arguing that civil conspiracies should be actionable 
without the completion of an independent tort, just as criminal conspiracies are prosecuted even if the 
planned-for crime was not committed). 
 113 See infra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismiss-
ing a claim of civil conspiracy because the public nuisance claim failed); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. 
Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 248 (E.D. La. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim be-
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example, in 1996, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana heard Jefferson v. Lead Industries Ass’n Inc., a case in which the 
mother of a child suffering from lead poisoning sued a trade association for 
lead producers under the premise that the trade association conspired to pro-
mote lead paint through fraudulent misrepresentation.115 The court, however, 
dismissed the case against the trade association because the plaintiff failed to 
prove all the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation.116 
The failure to prove an underlying tort has defeated climate related civil 
conspiracy claims as well.117 In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., the village brought a claim of civil conspiracy against the defendant 
fossil fuel companies.118 Plaintiffs, however, predicated this conspiracy claim 
on the underlying tort of public nuisance.119 Because the Clean Air Act dis-
placed federal public nuisance law, the court dismissed the civil conspiracy 
claim without granting it any consideration.120 
In cases involving accusations that an industry conspired to hide infor-
mation from the public, most plaintiffs rely on fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent concealment as the independent tort.121 Fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion and fraudulent concealment are related torts but their elements differ in 
critical ways.122 A fraudulent misrepresentation claim consists of a false state-
ment, made knowingly or recklessly, with the intent of deceiving someone, 
like the plaintiff, into relying on it.123 The plaintiff must then suffer an injury as 
a result of “justifiable reliance” on the statement.124 Fraudulent concealment 
requires proof that the defendant knowingly concealed a material fact, or re-
mained silent when they possessed a “duty to speak,” with the intent to pro-
                                                                                                                           
cause the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was not properly pleaded), aff’d, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
 115 Jefferson, 930 F. Supp. at 243, 248. 
 116 See id. at 248 (dismissing the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because the plaintiff 
failed to allege reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentative claims about lead paint in her com-
plaint). 
 117 See Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858 (dismissing a claim of civil conspiracy because 
the Clean Air Act displaced the substantive tort of public nuisance). 
 118 Id. at 853, 858. 
 119 See id. at 858 (holding that the civil conspiracy claim was reliant on the “substantive claim” of 
public nuisance). 
 120 See id. (dismissing the civil conspiracy claim because all parties agreed it depended upon the 
success of the public nuisance claim, which the court already rejected). 
 121 Ausness, supra note 20, at 400, 402. 
 122 See id. (providing the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment). 
 123 See id. at 400 (describing the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation as: “1) a representation; 
2) which is material to the transaction at hand; 3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or reck-
lessness as to whether it is true or false; 4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; 5) 
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and 6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the 
reliance”). 
 124 Id. 
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duce reliance on the part of the plaintiff, and that the silence resulted in injury 
to the plaintiff.125 
Fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment present unique 
challenges for plaintiffs.126 In fraudulent misrepresentation cases, plaintiffs often 
struggle to prove that they relied upon the defendant’s misrepresentation.127 For 
example, in 2000, in Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., in the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland, the plaintiffs asserted that Mr. 
White’s smoking habit constituted sufficient evidence that he relied upon the 
defendant’s advertising and promotional statements in deciding whether to 
smoke.128 The court rejected this assumption-based approach without further 
evidence that the decedent had actual knowledge of the tobacco companies’ 
statements and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for failing to prove that 
the decedent relied on any of the defendant’s statements or advertising.129 
Likewise, plaintiffs bringing fraudulent concealment cases often struggle 
to prove that the defendant had a duty to disclose.130 For example, in 2003, in 
Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld 
the dismissal of a fraudulent concealment claim because, without a duty to 
speak, the defendants’ silences alone did not constitute fraud.131 The court 
found no such duty and no evidence that the decedent’s cigarette addiction 
stemmed from the tobacco company’s silence about the dangers of smoking.132 
On the other hand, in 1987, in Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, the Supreme Court of Del-
aware held that a defendant who “actively conceal[ed] a material fact” could 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See id. at 402 (stating that the elements of civil conspiracy are: “1) deliberate hiding by the 
defendant of a material fact, or silence when there is a duty to speak, 2) ‘[t]hat the defendant acted 
with scienter,’ 3) intent to cause the plaintiff to rely upon the concealment, 4) causation, and 5) ‘dam-
ages resulting from the concealment’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 
146, 149 (Del. 1987)).  
 126 Id. at 401, 402 (discussing the challenges of proving reliance in fraudulent misrepresentation 
claims and a duty to speak in fraudulent concealment claim, respectively). 
 127 See Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207–08 (D. Mass. 
2000) (holding that plaintiff could not rely on the defendant’s “superior knowledge” and must demon-
strate reliance upon a particular fraudulent statement); Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (D. Md. 2000) (requiring proof that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
defendant’s fraudulent statements); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D.S.C. 1981) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s doctor did not rely on the defendant’s marketing material when deciding to 
prescribe diethyestilbestro).  
 128 Estate of White, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See, e.g., Viguers ex rel. Estate of Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2003); Nutt, 525 A.2d at 149, 150.  
 131 Viguers, 837 A.2d at 540. 
 132 See id. (finding that failure to speak about the dangers of smoking does not necessarily consti-
tute fraud). 
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be held liable for fraudulent concealment whether or not they ordinarily pos-
sessed a duty to speak.133 
C. Damages 
One cannot bring a claim of civil conspiracy without demonstrating the 
existence of actual harm caused by the defendant’s actions.134 This Section 
discusses two types of potential damages.135 Subsection 1 examines damages 
for lost opportunity.136 Subsection 2 explores restitution, otherwise known as 
disgorgement of unjust enrichments.137 
1. Lost Opportunity 
The majority of American jurisdictions recognize lost opportunity.138 Lost 
opportunity is a characterization of harm that permits recovery when tradition-
al categories of harm and rules of causation would not allow recovery.139 As 
described in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, lost opportunity is the harm suf-
fered minus the difference between probability of the harm occurring with the 
defendant’s actions and the probability of the harm occurring without the de-
fendant’s actions.140 Although most courts recognize lost opportunity as a cog-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Nutt, 525 A.2d at 149–50 (emphasis omitted). In this case, a group of plaintiffs sued several 
asbestos manufacturers, including Nicolet, Inc., seeking compensation for asbestos related illnesses. 
Id. at 147. The plaintiffs did not claim that their injuries were caused by exposure to Nicolet’s prod-
ucts, instead they asserted that “Nicolet participated in an industrywide conspiracy with other asbestos 
manufacturers to intentionally misrepresent and suppress information concerning the health hazards of 
asbestos and thus is liable for the asbestos-related injuries sustained by the various plaintiffs.” Id. The 
plaintiffs claimed that Nicolet was a member of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association and the 
Asbestos Textile Institute, and that these trade associations “suppressed publication as well as general 
dissemination of medical and scientific data concerning the health hazards associated with inhalation 
of asbestos fibers.” Id. at 148. 
 134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (AM. L. INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 3, 2018) (explaining damages are an element of any civil conspiracy claim). 
 135 See infra notes 138–159 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 138–151 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 152–159 and accompanying text. 
 138 See Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 95-0038 (La. 6/25/96); 676 So. 2d 543, 547 n.8 
(stating that lost chance or some variation has been adopted in “a majority of the states”); Scafidi v. 
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J. 1990) (concluding that a majority of the courts allow juries to consider 
whether defendant’s actions diminished the plaintiffs ability to recover); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l 
Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 400–01 (Tex. 1993) (finding that many states recognize lost chance and only 
eight have refused to adopt it). 
 139 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (AM. L. INST., 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that courts generally require that plaintiffs prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that adequate medical care would have produced a better outcome for the 
patient). 
 140 See id. (“The lost opportunity may be thought of as the adverse outcome discounted by the 
difference between the ex ante probability of the outcome in light of the defendant’s [wrongful act] 
and the probability of the outcome absent the defendant’s [wrongful act].”). 
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nizable harm, the majority apply it only to medical malpractice cases.141 Nev-
ertheless, the theory of lost opportunity can apply to a wide variety of cases 
with difficult-to-prove damages, and many scholars have argued for a more 
expansive application of the doctrine.142 
Some courts have recognized that plaintiffs should be able to recover for 
lost economic opportunities, such as earning potential.143 For example, in 
1991, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered this possibility in Snow 
v. Villacci, where the plaintiff, Snow, was injured when the defendant negli-
gently started a car and struck Snow in his garage.144 Snow sought damages for 
“a lost earning opportunity” stemming from the delay in his career advance-
ment.145 Prior to Snow’s injury he was pursuing career advancement training; 
however, after the accident Snow was unable to finish his course despite fully 
recovering from his injury.146 In deciding whether this type of damage was re-
coverable in Maine, the court distinguished lost opportunity damages from 
damages for lost earning capacity, which requires a continuing injury that lim-
its the plaintiff’s income-making ability.147 Instead, the court concluded that 
lost opportunity exists when the defendant’s actions deny the plaintiff a chance 
to take advantage of an opportunity he otherwise could have pursued.148 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine’s construction of lost opportunity 
fits well with an understanding of the harm as one’s lost opportunity to pursue 
a more desirable course of action rather than the lost opportunity to elude an 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. 
 142 David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 611–14 
(2001) (explaining the potential scope of a full-blown lost opportunity doctrine including medical and 
legal malpractice cases as well as failure to warn and failure to install safety devices); Joseph H. King, 
Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and 
Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1396–97 (1981) (advocating for an expansive use of lost 
opportunity). 
 143 See Snow v. Villacci, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d 360, 366 (upholding a denial of summary 
judgment because lost earnings opportunity is a cognizable harm); see also Rodriguez v. Henderson, 
578 N.E.2d 57, 62, 64, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim and had standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance where they alleged, among other things, lost 
job opportunities arising from the rezoning of a manufacturing district to a commercial/residential 
district). Unlike American courts, which have shown a preference for applying lost opportunities to 
physical harms, courts in the British Commonwealth apply the lost opportunity doctrine almost exclu-
sively to “cases involving economic loss.” Fischer, supra note 142, at 610, 613 (noting that American 
courts use lost doctrine in medical malpractice). 
 144 Snow, 754 A.2d at 362. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. at 363–64 (holding that lost earning capacity requires a permanent or ongoing injury, 
but lost opportunity requires only the loss of a preferred course of action). 
 148 See id. at 364 (holding that a lost opportunity occurs when a defendant’s actions cause the 
plaintiff to miss out on an opportunity the plaintiff otherwise might have been able to pursue). 
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injury or take advantage of a benefit.149 Because the lost opportunity is related 
to the inability to follow a preferred course of conduct, such harm could arise 
when a defendant knowingly caused a plaintiff to rely, to his detriment, on the 
defendant’s fraudulent acts or claims.150 This approach to lost opportunity 
would permit recovery in a wide variety of cases, such as medical malpractice 
cases where the defendant deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to seek the 
proper medical treatment, as well as product liability failure to warn cases.151 
2. Restitution 
Restitution, as a damage, requires the surrender of benefits wrongfully 
obtained.152 This disgorgement remedy strips a wrongdoer of any profits they 
might have obtained as a result of their misconduct.153 Disgorgement of unjust 
enrichments, sometimes referred to as ill-gotten gains, is an “equitable reme-
dy.”154 As such, disgorgement is not punitive in nature, but rather, designed to 
return the wrongdoer to the position they would have been in had they not en-
gaged in wrongful conduct.155 This equitable remedy, however, also provides 
the benefit of awarding potentially greater monetary damages than those typi-
cally available so long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that a rational connec-
tion exists between the profits sought and the defendant’s fraud.156 
A central challenge, therefore, when seeking disgorgement of unjust en-
richments is demonstrating that the causal link between the profits sought to be 
returned and the defendant’s misconduct is not so attenuated as to be consid-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See id. (describing lost opportunity damages as recoverable when the plaintiff is denied the 
opportunity to pursue an alternative course of conduct); Fischer, supra note 142, at 624 (describing an 
approach to the lost opportunity doctrine which would apply it to tortious conduct that deprives a 
plaintiff of the opportunity to pursue an alternate course of action); Stephen R. Perry, Protected Inter-
ests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 290–91 (1992) (proposing 
that lost opportunity doctrine should apply in the situation where the plaintiff has lost the chance to 
pursue any potentially superior course of action). 
 150 Fischer, supra note 142, at 624. 
 151 Denis W. Boivin, Factual Causation in the Law of Manufacturer Failure to Warn, 30 OTTA-
WA L. REV. 47, 85–86 (1998) (arguing that lost opportunity should apply to failure to warn cases 
where the plaintiff had a preferable course of action); Perry, supra note 149, at 291 (arguing that this 
theory could be used in medical malpractice cases). 
 152 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 (AM. L. INST., 
2011) (“A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”). 
 153 Id. § 51 cmt. e. 
 154 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (holding that damages are equitable when 
they amount to restitution); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (stating that 
restitution of illegally obtained profits is “within the recognized power and within the highest tradition 
of a court of equity”). 
 155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. k. 
 156 See Falk v. Hoffman, 135 N.E. 243, 244 (N.Y. 1922) (stating that whereas plaintiffs in securi-
ties fraud suits who sue “at law” can only recover for the current value of their shares, plaintiffs who 
sue in equity can recover the profits the defendants earned from the fraud). 
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ered too remote to support recovery.157 This is not an impossible task, however, 
as many courts have rules that actively favor the plaintiff in such cases.158 Such 
rules are reflected in the 1989 United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit case, Securities & Exchange Commission v. First 
City Financial Corp., which held that if the plaintiff can demonstrate a reason-
able connection between the profits sought and the wrongful act, then the bur-
den shifts to the defendants to demonstrate why the profits should not be dis-
gorged.159 
III. BUILDING A CLIMATE CONSPIRACY CASE 
Plaintiffs interested in bringing a climate conspiracy case against fossil 
fuel companies and their allies need to satisfy all the elements of civil conspir-
acy.160 Such plaintiffs will need to prove that the defendants agreed to conspire 
to commit some underlying tort, which resulted in cognizable damages to the 
plaintiffs.161 Section A of this Part explores the feasibility of demonstrating that 
the fossil fuel industry engaged in conspiracy by agreeing to coordinate lobby-
ing and public affairs efforts with the aim of spreading misinformation about 
the link between their product and climate change.162 Section B describes two 
potential substantive torts—fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent con-
cealment—which plaintiffs could bring to satisfy the underlying tort require-
                                                                                                                           
 157 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir. 1965) (suggesting that if an artist used sto-
len paints to produce a work of art, the art from which the paints were stolen would not be entitled to 
the painting as compensation). 
 158 See id. at 786 (“It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls 
than to let the fraudulent party keep them.”); Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 854 F.2d 443, 448 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he presumption operates so as to require the [defendants] to come forward with evi-
dence showing that the profit is attributable to causes other than their fraudulent purchase of [the 
claimant’s] interest.”). 
 159 See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(holding that courts only require a “a reasonable approximation of profits” flowing from the tort to 
make a disgorgement calculation, and that uncertainty in the calculation should be borne by the de-
fendant, because they are the responsible party). The court in First City recognized that “separating 
legal from illegal profits exactly may at times be a near-impossible task.” Id. at 1231. The court, there-
fore, established a rule where if the plaintiffs can show but-for causation between the illegal activity 
and profits, then the burden shifts to the defendants to prove that their profits from the “tainted trans-
actions” should not be disgorged. Id. at 1231–32; see Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105 
(3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, 
J., dissenting). 
 160 See supra notes 87–159 and accompanying text (providing a detailed explanation of the vari-
ous element of a claim of civil conspiracy). 
 161 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (AM. L. INST., Tentative 
Draft 2018) (defining civil conspiracy as consisting of three elements: 1) an agreement or meeting of 
the minds; 2) a substantive underlying tort other than the conspiracy; and, 3) actual harm). 
 162 See infra notes 165–173 and accompanying text. 
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ment.163 Section C examines the likelihood of plaintiffs demonstrating their 
damages flowed from the fossil fuel industries tortious actions.164 
A. The Conspiracy: Coordination Between Fossil Fuel Companies 
If plaintiffs want to succeed in a claim of civil conspiracy, they must first 
demonstrate the existence of an agreement between fossil fuel industry, their 
trade associations, and think tanks to act in a tortious manner.165 Even though 
the defendants all engaged in public relations efforts aimed at dissuading the 
adoption of climate change legislation, an agreement to act in a tortious man-
ner may be hard to prove.166 Many courts agree that parallel conduct alone is 
insufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy, particularly when that de-
fendants are engaged in otherwise legal activity, such as lobbying.167 
The fossil fuel industry, however, has engaged in more than the conscious 
parallel conduct rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit and the Supreme Court of Illinois in In re Asbestos School Litigation 
and McClure, respectively.168 In 1989, the fossil fuel companies founded the 
GCC to attack and sow doubt about the veracity of climate science.169 The cre-
ation of the GCC by the fossil fuel industry aligned the climate conspiracy case 
closely with precedent from In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See infra notes 174–193 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 194–208 and accompanying text. 
 165 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (describing the first 
element of civil conspiracy as an agreement to commit a tortious act); see, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary 
Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that MTBE producers entered an unlawful agreement for their civil con-
spiracy claim to succeed). 
 166 See McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 259 (Ill. 1999) (holding that 
parallel conduct is not enough to demonstrate defendants conspired); see also supra notes 104–107 
and accompanying text (describing the difficulties in proving the existence of an agreement between 
manufactures of the same product). 
 167 See Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 473 (Pa. 1979) (“The mere fact that 
two or more persons, each with the right to do a thing, happen to do that thing at the same time is not 
by itself an actionable conspiracy.” (quoting Fife v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 52 A.2d 24, 39 
(1947)); see also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 47–48 (Wis. 1984) (“[T]he drug companies 
apparently engaged in parallel behavior in both 1941 and 1947, but parallel behavior alone cannot 
prove agreement.”). 
 168 See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not see how a 
rational jury could find the existence of a civil conspiracy . . . based solely on the alleged fact that 
Pfizer and other defendants consciously engaged in parallel conduct.”); McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 267 
(holding the plaintiffs’ failure to produce evidence of an agreement, beyond parallel conduct by asbes-
tos manufactures, fatal to their case). 
 169 Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18; Mooney, supra note 74; see supra notes 79–81 and accom-
panying text (describing the formation of the Global Climate Coalition (GCC)). 
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Products Liability Litigation.170 There, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the formation of the MTBE Commit-
tee constituted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that MTBE manufacturers 
agreed to conceal the risks posed by MTBE.171 
To strengthen their cases, plaintiffs should explore the actions taken by 
API and other industry associations on behalf of their members as evidence of 
a possible agreement to unlawfully suppress climate change risks.172 Addition-
ally, the fossil fuel industry and their allies created and funded other organiza-
tions, such as the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation, that could serve 
as further evidence that defendants entered into an unlawful agreement to hide 
the dangers their products posed to a stable climate system.173 
B. The Substantive Tort 
Plaintiffs seeking to pursue a climate conspiracy case will also need to 
choose a substantive tort that underpins the alleged conspiracy.174 Because 
such plaintiffs will claim that the fossil fuel industry conspired to mislead the 
public on climate science and conceal the dangers their product posed to a safe 
climate system, the most obvious underlying torts are fraudulent misrepresen-
                                                                                                                           
 170 Compare MTBE Prods. Liab. Litg., 175 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (stating that defendants formed 
MTBE Committee to combat efforts by the EPA to require additional health testing for the chemical), 
with Mooney, supra note 74 (describing GCC’s efforts to slow regulation of greenhouse gases). 
 171 See MTBE Prods. Liab. Litg., 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634, 635 (finding the formation of task forces 
and other organizations to be sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between MTBE manufacturers). 
 172 See Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 248 (E.D. La. 1996) (dismissing claim 
against lead paint trade association only because the plaintiff was unable to prove all elements of the 
underlying tort), aff’d, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 
S.W.2d 788, 799–800 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that the tobacco trade association and an industry-
sponsored think tank were liable under a civil conspiracy claim); see also Mooney, supra note 74 
(describing API’s efforts to convince the public and lawmakers that the science on climate change was 
not settled). 
 173 Brulle, supra note 86, at 687–89, 692 (describing the Cato Institute and the Heritage Founda-
tion as major recipients of climate change counter-movement money). See generally supra note 86 
(discussing academic studies tracing the funding of climate denial organizations). Climate change 
counter-movement groups engage in activities designed to prevent the adoption of public policies that 
would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Brulle, supra note 86, at 683. One scholar identified 118 of 
such organizations, including trade organization as well as education and advocacy non-profits. Id. at 
684. Between 2003 and 2010, ninety-one of these organizations had a total income of more than $7 
billion. Id. at 685. The non-trade association players in the climate counter-movement include some of 
the best know conservative think tanks in the United States, such as the American Enterprise Institute, 
the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Heartland Institute, as well as advocacy organiza-
tions such as the Americans for Prosperity Foundation. Id. at 687–88, 692. 
 174 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 27 (AM. L. INST., Tentative 
Draft 2018) (describing the second element of civil conspiracy as a substantive underlying tort other 
than the conspiracy); see also Lewis Invisible Stitch Mach. Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Mach. Mfg. 
Corp., 80 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1936) (“Whatever may be the rule in criminal conspiracies, it is well 
settled that the civil liability does not depend upon the confederation . . . but upon the acts committed 
in realization of the common purpose.”). 
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tation and fraudulent concealment.175 Subsection 1 discusses fraudulent mis-
representation as it applies to a climate conspiracy suit.176 Subsection 2 de-
scribes fraudulent concealment as it applies to a climate conspiracy suit.177 
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
To succeed on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, climate conspiracy 
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant fossil fuel companies, their trade asso-
ciations, and think tanks made a material misrepresentation that they knew, or 
should have known, to be false.178 Furthermore, they must demonstrate that 
they made these misrepresentations with the aim of misleading the plaintiff 
and that the plaintiff “justifiabl[y] reli[ed] on the misrepresentation” and suf-
fered a harm.179 
Climate conspiracy plaintiffs should begin by demonstrating that fossil 
fuel companies made a knowing or reckless misrepresentation of climate sci-
ence.180 Although it is impossible to predict precisely how a trier of fact will 
decide the issue of intent, ample evidence exists to prove that fossil fuel com-
panies internally understood the risk posed by climate change, while publicly 
casting doubt on the science.181 
The most challenging component of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
is demonstrating that the plaintiffs relied on the fossil fuel industries’ misrepre-
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Ausness, supra note 20, at 400, 402 (describing fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent 
concealment as the most often-employed substantive tort for cases involving accusations that an in-
dustry conspired to hide information from the public). 
 176 See infra notes 178–185 and accompanying text. 
 177 See infra notes 186–193 and accompanying text. 
 178 See Ausness, supra note 20, at 400 (defining fraudulent misrepresentation as including a 
statement, “made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or 
false”). See supra notes 65–86 and accompanying text (describing how the fossil fuel industry and its 
allies deliberately concealed and misrepresented what they knew about climate change). 
 179 See Ausness, supra note 20, at 400 (stating that the misrepresentation must be made “with the 
intent of misleading another into relying on it” and cause “justifiable reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion”). 
 180 See id. (describing fraudulent misrepresentation as requiring the defendant to knowingly or 
recklessly make a misleading statement); Jerving et al., supra note 18 (discussing how Exxon internal-
ly acknowledged the scientific consensus about climate change while publicly stating that the science 
was uncertain and unreliable). Compare ROBINSON & ROBBINS, supra note 71 (an API report con-
cluding that climate change posed a significant risk), with Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18 (describ-
ing API’s funding of the GCC, and organizations whose mission was to create doubt about climate 
science), and Mooney, supra note 74 (describing API’s efforts to downplay the need for climate ac-
tion). 
 181 See Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18 (explaining how oil companies adapted their infrastruc-
ture to rising sea levels while funding attacks on climate science); Jennings et al., supra note 75 (de-
scribing an internal memorandum in which Exxon acknowledged the scientific consensus around 
anthropogenic climate change, but advocated a strategy of promoting misinformation to avoid regula-
tions). 
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sentation.182 As demonstrated by cases relating to the tobacco industry, courts 
routinely reject assumption-based approaches to demonstrating reliance, and 
instead require concrete evidence that the plaintiffs were exposed to and took 
the defendants’ statements seriously.183 As a result, climate conspiracy plain-
tiffs will need to be creative in developing evidence that their state or munici-
pal political leaders relied on the fossil fuel industry’s statement in determining 
appropriate climate policy.184 For example, plaintiffs could look to legislative 
history or the public statements of climate denying leaders to see if they par-
roted the industry’s talking points when opposing climate action.185 
2. Fraudulent Concealment 
Climate conspiracy plaintiffs looking to prove fraudulent concealment on 
the part of fossil fuel companies must demonstrate that the defendants know-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of proving reliance). 
 183 See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Estate of White v. R.J Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (D. Md. 2000) (finding a smoking habit alone insufficient to 
prove reliance on tobacco company’s fraudulent statements). 
 184 Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207–08 (D. Mass. 
2000) (holding that the plaintiff must plead specific facts demonstrating reliance, and cannot rely 
merely generalizations); Estate of White, 109 F. Supp. at 422–29 (requiring that the plaintiff provide 
evidence of particular instances of reliance). 
 185 See, e.g., Goldenberg, supra note 9 (describing an Alaskan politician as expressing doubt over 
whether humans cause climate change). For example, Pennsylvania is a state with little legislative 
progress on climate change, in part because of state legislators like Representative Daryl Metcalfe (R-
Butler) who believes reducing carbon dioxide emission will harm the planet. See Ryan Deto, State 
Rep. Daryl Metcalfe Says Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions Will Kill His Vegetables, PITT. CITY 
PAPER (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/state-rep-daryl-metcalfe-says-
reducing-carbon-dioxide-emissions-will-kill-his-vegetables/Content?oid=13785614 [https://perma.cc/
RM73-ZXV5] (“I enjoy my vegetables, and plants need CO2, so I want to make sure we have plenty 
of CO2 out there so we have green grass and green vegetables growing.”). Representative Metcalfe 
has used his position as the Chair of the House Environmental Resources and Energy Committee to 
invite industry-backed climate deniers to hearings at the state house and to block renewable energy 
and climate adaptation legislation. See Rachel McDevitt, Pa. Produces a Lot of Greenhouse Gases, 
but Its Republican-Led Legislature Isn’t Acting on Climate Change—Even as Scientists Say the Clock 
Is Ticking, NPR (Aug. 6, 2020), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/08/06/pennsylvania-
climate-change-greenhouse-gases-republican-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/7QUF-HHNH] (stating 
that Representative Metcalfe blocked climate bills with potential bipartisan support from coming up 
for debate); John L. Micek, Daryl Metcalfe Responded to DePasquale’s Climate Change Report in the 
Most Daryl Metcalfe Way Ever, PENN. CAP. STAR (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.penncapital-star.com/
commentary/daryl-metcalfe-responded-to-depasquales-climate-change-report-in-the-most-daryl-
metcalfe-way-ever-thursday-morning-coffee/ [https://perma.cc/R5B8-9B2D] (describing Repre-
sentative Metcalfe’s reaction the State Auditor’s report on the cost of extreme weather events and 
opposition to a climate change adaptation bill); see also Stephen Caruso, ‘The Stakes Are Too High’: 
Climate Skeptics Meet Their Own Critics at State House Committee Hearing, PENN. CAP. STAR (Oct. 
28, 2019), https://www.penncapital-star.com/energy-environment/the-stakes-are-too-high-climate-skeptics-
meet-their-own-critics-at-state-house-committee-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/XYB5-XQCR] (describing 
a hearing Representative Metcalfe organized during which climate deniers cited reports from the Cato 
Institute and others). 
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ingly concealed a material fact, or, despite having a duty to speak, remained 
silent.186 Plaintiffs must also prove that defendants did so intending for plain-
tiffs to rely on their concealment.187 
Unlike fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment avoids the 
difficulty of proving reliance, as the plaintiff need only show that the defend-
ant intended reliance.188 Although this may be a difficult task, it is not impos-
sible, as several internal documents, from Exxon and API, already detail how 
these entities intended to alter public opinion and policy with their actions.189 
Demonstrating that the defendants had a duty to disclose is the primary 
challenge facing a fraudulent concealment claim.190 Some courts have been hesi-
tant to impose a duty simply because the plaintiff suffered a possibly preventable 
negative outcome had the defendant spoken.191 Where the defendant deliberately 
conceals a material fact, however, some courts will find liability regardless of 
whether a clear duty exists.192 Fossil fuel companies arguably fall into the cat-
egory of deliberate concealers.193 
C. Damages 
The essence of the climate conspiracy suit is that the fossil fuel industry 
knew that their product was contributing to dangerous anthropogenic climate 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Ausness, supra note 20, at 402 (defining the elements of fraudulent concealment); 
Lieberman & Rust, supra note 18 (explaining that fossil fuel companies planned for climate change 
impacts while discouraging government adaptation and mitigation efforts). Compare ROBINSON & 
ROBBINS, supra note 71 (discussing the risks of climate change in an API report), with Cushman, 
supra note 83 (describing API’s plan to spread doubt about climate science). 
 187 Ausness, supra note 20, at 402 (explaining that fraudulent concealment requires: “intent to 
cause the plaintiff to rely upon the concealment”). 
 188 See id. at 400, 402 (explaining that fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the plaintiffs 
justifiably relied on the defendant’s fraudulent statement, whereas fraudulent concealment requires 
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant concealed with the intent that the plaintiff would rely on that 
concealment). 
 189 See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text (outlining the evolution of Exxon and API from 
leaders in climate science to advocates for climate denialism). 
 190 Ausness, supra note 20, at 402. 
 191 See Viguers ex rel. Estate of Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2003) (holding that defendant’s silence about the dangers of smoking silence is not enough to 
prove fraud). 
 192 See Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1987) (holding asbestos manufactures liable 
because they actively concealed the risks posed by asbestos). Like the asbestos companies in Nutt, 
fossil fuel companies understood that their product was altering the climate with potentially dangerous 
impacts, but nevertheless choose to spend millions of dollars to sow public doubt. See supra notes 18 
& 74–83 and accompanying text (detailing how fossil fuel companies spread misinformation about 
climate change). As such, it is foreseeable that a court would hold these companies liable regardless of 
whether a clear duty to disclose exists under common law. See Nutt, 525 A.2d at 150 (holding defend-
ants who deliberately conceal relevant information liable regardless of whether there was a duty to 
speak). 
 193 See supra notes 18 & 74–83 and accompanying text (describing the efforts of the fossil fuel 
industry to hide information about climate science). 
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change and, nevertheless, conspired to misrepresent the dangers to the public 
and policy makers.194 As a result of this fraud, society delayed the adoption of 
policies that would have reduced the demand for fossil fuels.195 Meanwhile, 
the fossil fuel industry profited from the continued high demand for their 
product created by this delay.196 These actions could lead to damages based in 
lost opportunity and disgorgement of unjust enrichments.197 
The costs of mitigating climate change caused by fossil fuel companies is 
uncertain.198 Plaintiffs, however, will need to assert that the conspirators’ fraud 
prevented them from pursuing mitigation at an earlier point in time.199 This 
fraud denied them the opportunity to pursue a less expensive and more prefer-
able decarbonization strategy.200 Although courts do not universally recognize 
this construction of lost opportunity damages, adequate academic and judicial 
support, both in the United States and abroad, exists to build a convincing ar-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 195 Farrell, McConnell, & Brulle, supra note 86, at 191–92; see supra note 86 and accompanying 
text (discussing a series of academic articles analyzing the extent and success of the climate disinfor-
mation campaign). 
 196 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/98-03 (S), WHAT DOES THE 
KYOTO PROTOCOL MEAN TO U.S. ENERGY MARKETS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY? 2 (1998), https://
www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/archive/1998/kyoto/pdf/oiaf9803s.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2H5-X2KZ] 
(predicting that the demand for coal could decline by a as much as seventy percent and demand for oil 
could decline by as much as thirteen percent if the United States ratified the Kyoto Protocol); see also 
Chloe Taylor, ‘Abrupt’ Climate Policies Could See High-Emitting Firms Lose 43% of Their Value, 
Research Claims, CNBC (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/09/climate-polices-could-
see-high-emitting-firms-lose-43percent-of-value-study.html [https://perma.cc/9WR9-X2WC] (de-
scribing how climate change policies could reduce the valuation of fossil fuel companies). 
 197 See Snow v. Villacci, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d 360, 364 (defining lost opportunity as the loss 
of a preferred course of action); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 
(AM. L. INST., 2011) (defining disgorgement of unjust enrichment as a remedy designed to prevent a 
defendant from profiting off their wrongdoing); supra notes 142–159 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the construction of lost opportunity and restitution damages). 
 198 Compare Adam Majendie & Pratik Parija, How to Halt Global Warming for $300 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/how-to-halt-
global-warming-for-300-billion [https://perma.cc/GQ27-CULD] (discussing a proposal to increase the 
ability of global soils to sequester carbon dioxide and slow climate change by twenty years for three 
hundred billion dollars), with Ishika Mookerjee, Morgan Stanley Says These Firms Will Profit from 
Climate Change, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-
24/-50-trillion-is-needed-to-stop-global-warming-morgan-stanley [https://perma.cc/X3AQ-CL2D] 
(discussing a report by Morgan Stanley that predicts stopping climate change will require fifty trillion 
dollars of investment). 
 199 See Snow, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d at 364 (holding that lost opportunity is when a defendant’s 
conduct prevents a plaintiff from pursuing an otherwise available course of action); supra note 86 
(discussing the success of the fossil fuel industries’ climate disinformation efforts). 
 200 See Snow, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d at 364 (finding that lost opportunity exists when “[an] 
opportunity arises which could otherwise have been utilized by the plaintiff, but is lost because of a 
disability caused by . . . the defendant”). 
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gument that courts should allow for recovery of lost opportunity in climate 
conspiracy cases.201 
Additionally, the fact that the defendants profited by fraudulently delay-
ing climate action will likely support the disgorgement of unjust enrich-
ments.202 There will certainly be some difficulty distinguishing which profits 
are the result of the defendants’ fraudulent actions.203 These barriers, however, 
can be overcome.204 For example, in the late 1990s, both private and public 
agencies developed projections for how fossil fuel demand would change if the 
United States ratified the Kyoto Protocol.205 If plaintiffs can demonstrate the 
reliability of such reports, they will likely be able to assert that any demand in 
excess of these projections is the results of the conspirators’ fraud.206 Courts 
would then likely place the burden on the defendants to prove that the profits 
are attributable to other causes.207 If the defendants fail to meet this burden, a 
court could order the disgorgement of profits.208 
CONCLUSION 
Since the late 1980s, the fossil fuel industry, along with their think tanks 
and associations, have engaged in a multi-billion-dollar campaign to delay 
climate action by spreading disinformation about climate change. This disin-
formation campaign successfully prevented national climate legislation and 
limited the response of many state governments. Some states and municipali-
ties, frustrated with the gridlock, turned to the court system to hold fossil fuel 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See supra notes 142–151 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Snow, 2000 ME 127, 754 A.2d at 
364; King, supra note 142, at 1396–97. 
 202 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e (stating that 
restitution requires that a wrongdoer surrender any profits obtained as a result of his misconduct); 
supra notes 152–159 and accompanying text. 
 203 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 196, at 2 (proposing seven different possible 
trajectories for decreased U.S. emissions if the country ratified the Kyoto Protocol). 
 204 See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(holding that although the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable link between profits and fraud, once 
that link is established it is the responsibility of the defendant to rebut); Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., 
Inc., 854 F.2d 443, 448 (11th Cir. 1988) (same). 
 205 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 196, at 2 (developing seven possible scenarios for 
fossil fuel consumption under the Kyoto Protocol, none of which the United States tracked). 
 206 See First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1231 (stating that “disgorgement need only be a reason-
able approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.”); see also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 
F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (“It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of 
windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them.”). 
 207 See Pidcock, 854 F.2d at 448 (stating that there is a presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s 
attribution of profits that the defendant must rebut with its own evidence); First City Fin. Corp., 890 
F.2d at 1232 (holding that because the defendant’s wrongful acts created uncertainty about how much 
profits should be disgorged, the court requires that the defendant bear the risk of that uncertainty). 
 208 See Pidcock, 854 F.2d at 448 (holding that the defendant must produce evidence demonstrat-
ing that the profits were not ascribable to the fraud). 
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companies liable and receive compensation for their climate impacts. Unfortu-
nately for these litigants, federal courts have largely dismissed their lawsuits, 
holding that the EPA’s power to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air 
Act displaces any common law right to sue for public nuisance and negligence. 
Although several plaintiffs successfully convinced federal district courts to 
remand public nuisance law claims to state courts, the long-term viability of 
this strategy remains uncertain. 
The courthouse door is not fully closed to plaintiffs, however. By combin-
ing civil conspiracy with fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent conceal-
ment, plaintiffs can target and hold companies accountable for what has con-
sistently delayed climate action: disinformation about the nature and causes of 
climate change. Even though proving a civil conspiracy case will not be easy, 
the conspiracy strategy produces several advantages. Civil conspiracy allows 
actors who participated in an unlawful or tortious agreement to be brought to 
account, even when they only planned, funded, or encouraged the underlying 
fraud. Meanwhile, the focus on fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment as 
the underlying tort removes the suit from the realm of Clean Air Act displace-
ment. Although untested, this strategy may ultimately prove more fruitful than 
the existing public nuisance-based litigation approach. 
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